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Abstract
A survey conducted in Mississippi, Texas, Indiana, and Nebraska elicited producers’ preferences for various farm policy changes. This permitted examination of the diversity of
preferences that single-state studies have not allowed. Five policy choices, including deficiency payments, loan programs, crop insurance, export programs, and disaster payments
were examined. Logit model results predicting producer preferences for each of the five
dichotomous policy choices are reported. Explanatory variables based on expected utility
theory such as risk aversion, price and yield variability, and price–yield correlation are significant in various models.

There are often intense debates about the future direction of farm policy. As
Congressional leaders and the Administration continue to seek solutions to concerns expressed by producers and their representative organizations, they are
often confronted by divergent and even contradictory messages from various
regions and producer groups. Because alternative policies have potentially dissimilar economic implications for producers, their preferences could logically be
derived from an economic evaluation of the various alternatives. The research reported in this paper follows the vein of literature that has investigated producer
policy preferences at various points in time. Past agricultural policy surveys include Barkley and Flinchbaugh; Edelman and Lasley; Kastens and Goodwin; Orazem, Otto, and Edelman; and Zulauf, Guither, and Henderson.
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Scrimgeour and Passour related preferences for farm policy to the public
choice literature where self-interest is generally treated as a strong force motivating individual political preferences. They go on to argue that many factors beyond wealth maximization may enter into policy preferences. Given that many
farm policy options under consideration today involve providing risk protection,
a natural extension of policy preference analysis consistent with Scrimgeour and
Passour is to consider policy preferences in an expected utility framework.
This study explores producers’ preferences for current farm policy options. It
is commonly observed that these preferences differ by commodity and region.
U.S. farm policy generally reflects a compromise among these competing interests, compared with a more decentralized policy structure, such as in Canada.
However, the causal economic relationships between policy preferences and economic context in which producers operate is not always clear. For example, a
stronger preference for the FAIR Act in the Midwest than in the South during
the 1996 farm bill debate was reflected in the legislative concessions leading to
final passage. However, economic factors that underlie producer preferences
in the various regions are not clear. By capturing variables that characterize the
economic context of respondents, we provide insights into the basis for particular policy preferences. A better understanding of the underlying causes of policy preference may lead to a clearer dialogue with respect to formulation of future farm policy. In particular, we examine the economic characteristics of those
producers who favor and disfavor the general policy trends of the past decade—
movement away from deficiency payments and toward greater reliance on insurance programs.
Survey Procedures
A survey conducted in the spring of 1999 elicited producers’ preferences for
various farm policy changes. The project objective was to gain a better understanding of farmers’ risk management decision making and educational needs.
The survey was conducted in Mississippi, Texas, Indiana, and Nebraska. Two major crops were chosen for particular emphasis in each state: corn and soybeans in
Indiana and Nebraska; cotton and soybeans in Mississippi; and cotton and grain
sorghum in Texas.1
Each state’s Agricultural Statistical Service was contracted to sample from
their pool of commercial farms. After excluding small noncommercial farms generating less than $25,000 in gross income, the sample was stratified across four
categories of gross farm income. Mail surveys were sent to crop producers near
planting. A follow-up reminder card was sent two weeks following the first mailing and a second mailing was sent to those who had not returned the survey two
weeks after the postcard reminder. A total of 1,812 questionnaires were returned
for a response rate of 26.6%. After elimination of nonresponses to particular questions used in this analysis, 1,350 useable responses were analyzed.
Producers were asked to compare two policy alternatives and to state their
preference for one versus the other. Five possible responses were allowed:
strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, or not sure. In this analysis,
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the responses are collapsed into a binary choice framework. Responses of either
strongly agree or agree are treated as a positive response to a particular policy, while responses of disagree, strongly disagree, and not sure are treated as
a nonpositive response. This approach does not fully reflect the diversity of responses that might be captured with a multinomial model. However, this approach allows for a simplicity of interpretation that is confounded by more
complex models.2
Policy Choices Examined
Five policy choices were examined (table 1). First, producers were asked if
they agreed or disagreed with the statement, “Eliminate transition payments and
go back to deficiency payments.” This question elicited producers’ preference for
the 1996 Freedom to Farm Act versus the deficiency payment program that had
existed prior to 1996. Producers were also asked if they agreed or disagreed with
“Subsidies should be increased on higher crop insurance coverages, rather than
increasing the level of catastrophic coverage.” This question was relevant to the
Congressional debate on crop insurance reform. Catastrophic coverage insurance
provides a 50% yield guarantee indemnified at 55% of expected price. Subsidies
for higher crop insurance coverage options were keyed off the value of the catastrophic coverage policy. However, the percent subsidy on higher levels of coverage declined from 100% on a catastrophic policy. A key provision of crop insurance reform enacted in 2000 was increasing the benefits of the program through
higher subsidies on buy-up coverage. The impact of this change on producer welfare is still a matter of debate (Skees).
Producers were also asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement, “Raise loan rates rather than increase crop insurance funding.” Much of
the decline in farm income since 1997 was due to price declines resulting from
weakened export markets. The 1996 farm bill left the marketing loan program intact, but capped at 1995 levels. Thus, this question elicited producers’ preferences
for price support through higher marketing loan rates versus increased insurance
subsidies.
To elicit preferences between export enhancement programs and domestic
price supports, producers were asked for agreement or disagreement with the
statement: “Expand export assistance programs rather than raise loan rates.” This
question was meant to capture producer preferences for indirect price support
through a program that increases the foreign demand for U.S. production and
presumably raises domestic prices versus a program that mitigates the effect of
low prices by providing payments which make up the shortfall when price falls
below the loan rate.
Producers were also asked if they agreed or disagreed with the statement,
“Provide insurance premium subsidies, rather than make disaster payments.”
This question elicited producer preferences for receiving risk protection in the
form of insurance subsidized at a higher level rather than disaster payments,
which have traditionally been offered after a disaster event and on an ad hoc basis. Producers in all four states were assumed familiar with the choices, given that
ad hoc disaster payments were made in 1998 through 2000.
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Table 1. Dependent and independent variables examined
Dependent Variables

Description

		

Producers were asked how strongly they agree or disagree with the statement: a

Prefer deficiency payments

Eliminate transition payments and go back to deficiency
payments.

Prefer export enhancement

Expand export assistance programs rather than raise loan
rates.

Prefer more insurance
Subsidies should be increased on higher crop insurance
subsidy 		 coverages rather than increasing the level of catastrophic coverage.
Prefer increased loan rates

Raise loan rates, rather than increase crop insurance
funding.

Prefer insurance premium
Provide insurance premium subsidies, rather than
subsidy 		 make disaster payments.
Independent Variables

Description

Total crop acres

Total owned and rented crop acres in the farming operation in 1999.

Percent corn

Intended planted corn acres in 1999 divided by the total
crop acres.

Percent soybeans

Intended planted soybean acres in 1999 divided by the
total crop acres.

Percent cotton

Intended planted cotton acres in 1999 divided by the total crop acres.

Percent sorghum

Intended planted sorghum acres in 1999 divided by the
total crop acres.

Yield risk

Producers evaluated yield risk on a 5-point scale as to the
potential effect on their farm income. Five represented
a high potential to affect farm income. Respondents
indicating a value of 5 are identified with a dummy
variable.

Price risk

Producers evaluated price risk on a 5-point scale as to
the potential effect on their income. Five represented
a high potential to affect farm income. Respondents
indicating a value of 5 are identified with a dummy
variable.

Perceives negative
Perceptions of negative farm yield–price correlation
yield–price correlation 		 between farm yield and price were elicited through a
hypothetical scenario where their farm yield fell 30%
below average. Respondents were asked whether
they would expect prices to increase, decrease, or remain unchanged given this yield shock. Individuals expecting an increase in market price given a low
yield for either major crop on their farm are indicated
by a dummy variable.
(Continued )
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Table 1. Continued
Independent Variables

Description

Risk aversion

Producers were asked their willingness to accept a lower
price to avoid risk on a 5-point agree/disagree scale.
This question, although couched in terms of price
risk, is indicative of whether the individual is willing to pay a risk premium. Individuals indicating that
they agreed or strongly agreed that they were willing
to accept a lower price risk are indicated by a dummy
variable.

Below average income

Survey respondents were asked whether the producer’s farm income in 1998 was below the average of the
preceding 5 years.

Percent farm income

Survey respondents were asked what percent of their 		
household gross farm income was from farming.

Percent borrowed

Producers were asked what percent of the total assets
were used in the farming.

College education

The college education variable indicates completion of at
least a 4-year college degree.

Perceive government
Producers were asked, “In terms of the potential to affect
program risk 		 your farm income, how would you rate changes in
government programs as a source of risk?” Measured
on a 5-point scale, a 5 indicated government program
changes had a strong potential to affect farm income
and a 1 indicated that they perceive government program changes as a low risk. A dummy variable is
used to indicate the respondent marked either a 4 or 5
on the 5-point scale.
Crop insurance purchase

a

The purchase of buy-up crop insurance is indicated by a
dummy variable, which takes a value of one if the individual purchased some form of buy-up crop insurance in 1998. This variable takes a value of zero for all
individuals who did not purchase crop insurance or
only purchased the catastrophic coverage policy.

Treated as a positive response if the respondent either strongly agreed or agreed.

Data
Fifty-six percent of the sample indicated that they would prefer to go back to
the deficiency payment program (table 2). The second dependent variable, indicating a preference for increased insurance subsidies over increased catastrophic
coverage, was preferred by 53% of the survey respondents. Of the five dependent
variables, the lowest level of agreement, 42%, was indicated for the question asking a preference for increased loan rates rather than increased insurance subsidies. Forty-five percent of producers indicated that they prefer export enhancement to increased loan rates. Fifty-four percent of those responding indicated that
they would prefer insurance programs to disaster payments.
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Table 2. Data summary
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Prefer a return to deficiency payments
56.0
Prefer more insurance subsidy to increased
catastrophic coverage
53.0
Prefer increased loan rates to increased
insurance subsidy
42.0
Prefer Export Enhancement to increased
loan rates
45.6
Prefer insurance premium subsidy to
disaster payments
54.0
Yield risk
0.44
Price risk
0.69
Perceives negative yield–price correlation
0.28
Risk aversion
0.33
1998 income was below 5-year average
0.65
Percent of income from farming
73.53
Percent of farm investment borrowed
31.9
College education
0.36
Perceive government program risk
0.64
Crop insurance purchase
0.53
Total crop acres
1,440.4
Percent corn acres
24.0
Percent soybean acres
28.0
Percent cotton acres
14.0
Percent sorghum acres
3.0

50.0

0

100

50.0

0

100

49.0

0

100

49.7

0

100

50.0
0.49
0.46
0.45
0.47
0.48
27.62
28.25
0.48
0.48
0.50
1,572.7
23.0
27.0
25.0
11.0

0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
46
0
0
0
0

100
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
100
99
1.00
1.00
1.00
18,000
97.0
96.0
99.0
98.0

The first three independent explanatory variables reflect the perceived potential for yield and price variability to affect farm income and the correlation between price and yield.
The mean values for price and yield variability are both relatively high.
Slightly more than 44% of respondents indicated yield variability had a high potential to affect their farm income and 69% of respondents indicated price variability had that potential.
A negative correlation between market price and farm yield may influence the
overall risk environment of a firm. For example, a strong negative correlation implies price and yield variations tend to offset each other. There is evidence suggesting that negative correlation may exist in some crops and regions (Heifner
and Coble; Hennessy, Babcock, and Hayes). Twenty-eight percent of respondents
perceived that there was a negative correlation between the yield of one of their
crops and market price.
In an indicator of risk aversion, 33% of respondents were identified as willing
to accept a lower price to avoid risk on a 5-point agree/disagree scale. This percentage is comparable to the previous study by Musser, Patrick, and Eckman that
elicited similar producer risk preferences.
The “1998 Income Was Below 5-Year Average” variable was included to indicate whether the producers had recently suffered a farm income loss, making
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them more sensitive or vulnerable to risks in the current year. Summary statistics
show that 65% of the respondents had below-average income in 1998.
One of the commonly recognized approaches to mitigating farm risk is augmenting the farm family’s income with off-farm earnings. This has the potential
to both raise household income and diversify it. Survey respondents were asked
the percent of household gross farm income from farming. The average value was
73.5%, with a range from 2 to 100%.
Percent of total farm investment that is borrowed measures an important aspect of financial risk. This information is hypothesized to be an important component of characterizing the risk decision-making environment for the farm. Among
the survey respondents, the mean value was 31.98%.
The college education variable indicates completion of at least a 4-year college
degree and serves as an indicator of management training. The summary statistics show that 36% of the individuals responding to the survey had completed a
4-year college degree.
Sixty-four percent of the respondents perceive government program risk as
having significant potential to affect their farm income. The purchase of buy-up
crop insurance is indicated by a dummy variable. Fifty-three percent of the individuals in the survey bought some form of buy-up crop insurance.
Total crop acres was included in the analysis to reflect differences in scale of
operation. Among the survey respondents, the mean total crop acres was slightly
more than 1,440 acres. The maximum size was 18,000 acres of cropland.
The next four variables indicate the percent of total acres planted to a specific
crop (corn, soybeans, cotton, and sorghum). It is hypothesized that potential differences in the economic context of producing different crops may influence policy preferences. For example, cotton tends to be a high-input and high-cost crop
compared to soybeans. Of the four crops, soybeans had the highest mean percentage value of approximately 28%. Sorghum, which is only analyzed in one state,
has the lowest mean value of 3%. A maximum value of near 100% indicates that
some of the participating farms were nearly completely specialized in production
of each of the crops.
Results
The logit model results indicate several significant relationships between economic variables and farm policy preferences. For example, the effect of the components of revenue variability (yield risk, price risk, and yield–price correlation)
are related directly to policy preferences. These may be argued to be fundamental
underlying causes of preferences that have often been characterized as regional
differences. An understanding that an economic parameter like yield–price correlation may influence policy preference is instructive both because this perception differs by region and crop and because previous studies of policy preferences
have generally overlooked such variables.
Because the parameter estimates in a logit model do not reflect the marginal effect of a variable as in ordinary least squares models, marginal effects are calculated and reported. Further, Greene’s recommended approach of calculating the
marginal effect at every observation is followed. The averages of individual marginal effects are reported in table 3 and are calculated based on a probability range

6.57
–9.24
0.19
0.07
0.01
0.09
–0.23

—
27.87
0.15
–0.14
0.05
0.12
0.07

9.81
—
–0.07
–0.13
–0.04
0.29
–0.08
105.202
65.4

Likelihood ratio
Percent concordant

Marginal effects in bold are based upon parameter estimates that are significant at the 10% level.

50.44
60.1

61.2
61.5

83.5
64.2

of

—
13.36
–0.05
0.15
0.13
0.04
–0.04

5.80
8.80
–4.63
0.09
0.06
5.81

Review

–9.48
—
0.00
0.11
0.17
–0.02
0.30

6.02
7.64
–1.86
–0.017
–0.018
6.28

5.20

13.58

et al. in

181.64
70.5

–4.77
3.40
5.26
0.10
–0.004
–6.96

2.39
8.20
–2.36
–0.01
0.12
5.25

–2.65
1.39
7.31
–0.05
0.06
–9.56

14.89

2.16

Prefer
Insurance
to Disaster
Programs
Coble

13.20

–11.57

2.06

–8.53

7.72

Prefer More
Prefer
Prefer
Insurance Subsidy
Increased
Increased Export
to Increased
Loan Rates to
Programs to
Catastrophic
More Insurance Increased Loan
Coverage
Subsidy
Rates

–5.25

Prefer to Go
Back to the
Deficiency
Payment
Program

Yield variability perceived as a high potential to
affect farm income
Price variability perceived as a high potential to
affect farm income
Perceive a negative correlation between farm yield
and price
Risk aversion
1998 income was below 5-year average
Percent of household gross income from farming
Percent of total farm investment that is borrowed
College education
Government programs perceived as having a high
potential to affect farm income
Purchased buy-up crop insurance
Total crop acres (100s)
Percent of total acres planted to corn
Percent of total acres planted to soybeans
Percent of total acres planted to cotton
Percent of total acres planted to sorghum

Marginal Effects of Explanatory Variables
on the Probability of Preferring
the First Policy

Table 3. Marginal effects
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of 0 to 100%. For discrete explanatory variables, marginal effects are calculated
as the difference in the probability of preferring the first policy given the dummy
variable is set equal to one versus zero.
Likelihood ratio test chi-squared statistics for each of the models are reported
and all models are strongly significant. A second measure of model performance,
percent concordance, gives the percent of observations where the predicted and
observed response agree. The models had a percent concordance ranging from
60% to 71%.
The three variables characterizing the components of revenue variability—
price risk, yield risk, and yield–price correlation—are each significant in some
models. These variables are assumed to reflect the magnitude of risk the producer faces and not the degree of risk aversion, which is quantified separately.
Producers perceiving yield variability as having a significant potential to affect
them have a 5.2% lower probability of preferring a return to deficiency payments
and are 13.6% more likely to prefer insurance subsidy to disaster payments. This
is consistent with wanting relatively more government funding devoted to higher
insurance protection and relatively less to price protection programs. The implication is that producers facing relatively greater yield risk are more likely to support enhanced insurance programs over low-level yield coverage or even the
price support provided under the previous farm bill.
Those perceiving a high degree of price risk are 11.6% less likely to prefer insurance subsidy over catastrophic coverage, have a 13.2% higher probability of
preferring increased loan rates to insurance subsidy, and 14.9% higher probability of desiring an increase in export programs rather than loan programs. Combining the last two results and the fact that price variability is not significant in
the “return to deficiency payments” question suggests that those perceiving a
high degree of price risk want price protection and have a clear preference for
how it should be achieved. They are not inclined to return to deficiency payments, or utilize crop insurance (including revenue insurance) for risk protection. Rather, they support increases in loan programs, but prefer export programs even more.
The price–yield correlation variable has a positive effect on the probability
of preferring insurance to disaster programs and on the preference for export
programs over increased loan rates. Producers who perceive a negative correlation between price and yield are 5.8% more likely to prefer insurance funding
over disaster programs. A factor here may be the introduction of revenue insurance. Individuals perceiving negative correlation in price and yields might be
expected to prefer revenue insurance because revenue indemnities are more reflective of their economic losses than yield-triggered disaster payments. Likewise, the positive effect of price–yield correlation on the preference for export
programs versus the loan rate may stem from a recognition that when yield and
price are correlated, managing only price or yield risk may do a poor job of protecting revenue. As Miranda and Glauber show, when a negative price–yield
correlation exists, censoring either price or yield risk individually may do little
to reduce revenue risk.
Risk aversion has a significant positive effect on the preference for increased
insurance subsidy over increased catastrophic coverage, insurance over disaster programs, and export enhancement rather than increasing the loan rate. In
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all three models, the difference in probability is more than 7%. This suggests that
risk aversion is positively related to a preference for the high levels of protection
afforded by buy-up insurance coverage versus the low level of yield protection
afforded by either catastrophic coverage or disaster programs.
Producers who realized a below-average farm income in 1998 might be expected to desire greater government support. Given that the questions posed require a preference between alternative policies, it was found that this variable
is positively related to a desire for traditional farm policy mechanisms. Farmers
who incurred a below average income in 1998 are 7.3% more likely to desire a return to deficiency payments and 5.3% more likely to prefer increased loan rates
over insurance subsidy. Farmers incurring a below-average income in 1998 are
also 4.6% less likely to show a preference for insurance over disaster programs.
Thus, this group appears least in favor of the policy trends toward Freedom to
Farm and expanding crop insurance programs.
The percent of household income from farming is significant in two models.
This variable has a positive relationship with both a preference for increasing
loan rates over insurance subsidy and for insurance versus disaster payments.
The marginal effect of this variable is near 0.09 in both models. This implies that a
10% increase in the percent of household income coming from farming increases
the probability by slightly less than 1%.
While the percent of farm investment that is borrowed often is suggested as
an important component of the risk characteristics of a farm, it is significant in
only one of our policy models. It has a positive effect on the probability of preferring insurance subsidy over catastrophic coverage, with the marginal effect calculated to be 0.12. This implies that a 10% increase in the farm’s percent debt increases the probability of preferring insurance subsidy to increased catastrophic
coverage by just over 1%.
The college education variable is significant in all five models and is positively
associated with the policy trends of the 1990s—toward Freedom to Farm and expanding crop insurance programs. This variable is estimated to have a marginal
effect of -9.6% in the model of a preference for a return to deficiency payments
and an effect of -7.0% in the model of preferring increased loan rates to increased
insurance subsidy. Conversely, college education has a positive effect of 5.3% on
the probability of preferring insurance subsidy to catastrophic coverage. Similarly, this variable has a positive 6.3% effect on the preference for export programs relative to loan rates and a 5.8% marginal effect in the model of preferring
insurance subsidy to disaster payments. It is our interpretation of these results
that college-educated producers are more likely to understand economic relationships and have less confidence in direct government intervention into commodity and risk markets. The college educated perceive deficiency payments, loan,
and disaster programs negatively, while giving indication that they desire insurance and export programs. Further, the college educated appear to want to obtain
a level of insurance protection above some free minimal coverage as provided by
catastrophic insurance and ad hoc disaster programs.
Producers who perceive government programs as having a high potential to
affect income tend to prefer a return to deficiency payments, loan rates to insurance subsidy, and are less likely to prefer exports over loan rates. The marginal
effect is a positive 9.8% on the preference for a return to deficiency payments
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and a 6.6% increase in the probability of preferring loan rates over insurance
subsidy.
Previous purchase of buy-up insurance is consistently related to a preference
for higher insurance subsidies rather than increased loan rates, disaster programs,
or greater catastrophic coverage. Having previously purchased crop insurance increases the probability of preferring insurance subsidy to increased catastrophic
coverage by 27.9%. This variable also has a marginal effect of -9.2% in the model
of preferring increased loan rates to more insurance and a positive 13.4% effect in
the insurance versus disaster programs model. These results suggest that those
who have previously participated in buy-up insurance tend to find it useful, and
would like to see additional government resources devoted to it.
Farm size is significant and positive in two of the five models. Given the
economies of scale in agricultural production and the imposition of payment
limitations on some government programs, it is not surprising that size would
influence some preferences. Farms with more crop acres prefer more insurance
subsidy to increased catastrophic coverage and increased loan rates to more insurance subsidy. This suggests larger farms find relatively little value in lowlevel insurance coverage and desire the price guarantee provided by loan programs. The aggregation effect of farm size can be considered in these two
results. Catastrophic insurance coverage applies to all acres of a crop in which
an individual has an interest. Higher coverages afford more protection and allow subdivision of acres into smaller insurance units. This makes buy-up coverage relatively more beneficial than catastrophic coverage to the large producer.
Again, aggregation may play a role in the preference for price protection over
insurance subsidy. If, by expanding the scale of operation, a producer becomes
increasingly spatially diversified, then price risk will become relatively more
important in comparison to yield risk.
The percent crop acres variables are each significant in at least one model. Percent of crop acres planted to corn is most often significant—in three of the five
models. The most intriguing finding is the opposite signs taken by percent corn
acres and percent cotton acres. Cotton producers are significantly more likely to
prefer a return to deficiency payments and increased insurance subsidy over catastrophic coverage. The percent of acres planted to corn takes the opposite sign in
both models. A farm with a 10% higher percentage of acres planted to corn would
be about 1.3% less likely to prefer going back to deficiency payments and 1.4%
more likely to prefer increased insurance subsidy over increased catastrophic
coverage. Conversely, a 10% increase in cotton acres increases the probability of
preferring a return to deficiency payments by 2.9% and the probability of preferring insurance subsidy over catastrophic coverage by 1.2%. This dichotomy suggests that the economics of these two crops are sufficiently distinct to lead to divergent policy preferences. We surmise that this divergence of policy preference
stems in part from differences in producers’ views of the U.S. markets. U.S. cotton has many world competitors and makes up a relatively small share of world
exports. Cotton producers are likely to desire the protection of deficiency programs in spite of distortionary trade effects. Conversely, U.S. corn is a large share
of world corn exports and past experience with deficiency payments and the associated acreage set-asides may be perceived as harmful to remaining competitive in world markets.
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Conclusions and Interpretation
This study provides insights into producer policy preferences at a time when
much attention is being given to farm policy issues. It is unique in that crop producers from four diverse regions are included. This permitted examination of the
diversity of preferences that single-state studies have not allowed.
Our results indicate that there are strong commodity effects in policy preference, even after accounting for obvious crop differences, such as price and yield
variability. For example, the economics of cotton and corn production appear to
lead to strongly differing policy preferences. Further, it appears that modeling
policy preferences in a fashion that accounts for the risks a producer faces and
the producer’s risk preferences is fruitful. Price or yield variability was significant in every model, and risk aversion significantly influenced three of five policy
choices. The significance of variables quantifying risk and risk aversion suggests
that analysis of policy preferences under the assumption of risk neutrality may
lead to erroneous conclusions. Further, we find that producers perceive negative
farm yield–price correlations and that these perceptions influence certain policy
preferences. To our knowledge, this is a new finding.
Given that policy trends of the 1990s were away from deficiency and disaster payments, we can characterize several variables that are associated with favoring or disfavoring this trend. Producers who have a college education reveal
preferences that are clearly consistent with this trend. Conversely, producers who
perceive changes in farm programs as a risk and those who recently incurred a
below-average income show a clear preference for returning to previous farm
policies. We believe that the below-average income year variable suggests a transitory component of policy preferences that may be strongly influenced by recent
events.
These findings add to our understanding of why producers of different commodities and regions do not always agree on preferred policy. Recognizing the
underlying economic factors influencing farm policy preferences may provide
guidance to finding resolution. While it is common for political leaders and various interest groups to be well versed in the economic situation of their constituents, this analysis gives perspective across regions and commodities that is seldom available.
Acknowledgments
This research was supported by a USDA Risk Management Education grant. The
views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily the
views of USDA.
Endnotes
1 This survey was conducted as part of a research project funded through a U.S. Department of Agriculture risk management education initiative.
2 Auxiliary models that exclude all responses of “not sure” were estimated, but not reported, to test the influence of including these responses with those not agreeing with
the statement. Out of 31 significant parameters in the models reported in this paper, 22
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retained the same sign and significance. No significant parameter estimate switched to
an opposite and significant sign. However, 9 parameters lost significance, which may
partially be explained by a decline of about one-third in sample size. Six parameters that
were not significant in the reported models became significant in the alternative models.
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